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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment 
in favor of Hood Corporation (hereinafter "Hood") on the issue of 
alter ego? 
2. Is it reversible error for the district court to elect 
to not reconsider a matter which has been previously argued and 
resolved on its merits? 
3* Did the District Court err in stating that the Salt 
Lake City Corporation (hereinafter "SLCC"), as a governmental 
entity with vast resources, should be held to a higher standard 
of performance in pursuing a legal action against a private 
entity, and further, that they be bound by the performance of the 
counsel they have retained? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 15, 1984, James Constructors, Inc., a Nevada 
corporation, filed a suit against SLCC, Civil No. C-84-2857, in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. The substance of such suit was with regard to a contract 
between the two entities to construct a water pipeline known as 
the Big Cottonwood Conduit Extension Terminal Park Transmission 
Pipeline. 
On or about the 28th of June, 1984, SLCC filed a separate 
action against James Constructors, Inc., a Nevada corporation, 
Hood Corporation, a California corporation, and Industrial 
Indemnity Company, a California corporation. Such action was 
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filed as Civil No. C-84-3972 in the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah* 
On the 13th day of August, 1984, pursuant to motion, the 
District Court ordered the above referenced actions consolidated 
and directed various parties to answer and file responsive 
pleadings (R. 63-64). On the 5th of September, 1984, Hood, by 
and through its attorney of record, David A. Reeve, filed its 
answer to SLCC ' s Complaint. SLCC was represented by its 
attorney, Arthur Kessler. 
SLCC took the depositions of the chief representatives of 
each of the named defendants, to wit: James Foreman, President 
of James Constructors, Inc., on December 11, 1984; Marc Laulhere, 
President of Hood Corporation, on December 18, 1984; and Ken 
Evans, Chief Officer of Industrial Indemnity Company on December 
18, 1984. Further, SLCC responded to two sets of Interrogatories 
propounded by the defendants. 
On or about July 5, 1985, SLCC amended its Complaint to 
clarify its cause of action and to restate its position against 
various defendants (R. 131-134). 
On the 2nd day of August, 1985, the defendant Hood's Motion 
for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable Judith M. Billings, District Judge (R. 161). In 
support of said Motion, Hood's counsel filed a Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities setting forth various bases upon which 
their Motion should be granted (R. 113-124). In addition to such 
Memorandum, an Affidavit of Marc Laulhere, President of Hood 
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Corporation, was filed in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 145-147). 
SLCCfs counsel, Arthur Kessler, in response to Hood's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed no reply memoranda or 
affidavits of any party having any material knowledge, but 
instead, filed one document entitled "Reply Affidavit", written 
in the form of an affidavit, under oath, by Attorney Kessler, 
which set forth the theory of SLCC in its claims against Hood (R. 
153-160). 
Attorney Kessler, representing SLCC, continued in his Reply 
Affidavit to discuss point by point criteria of the alter ego 
theory for holding one party liable for the acts of another. He 
further cited from the deposition taken from the president of 
Hood, Marc Laulhere, and in support of SLCC's position. No 
dispositions were on file with, presented to, or published by the 
District Court. 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, through the Honorable Judith M. Billings, after hearing 
arguments of counsel and reviewing and considering such materials 
as filed by the respective parties, granted the Summary Judgment 
in favor of Hood (R. 161). Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and the Summary Judgment documents were prepared by Hood's 
counsel and approved as to form by counsel for SLCC (R. 162-166). 
The Summary Judgment was entered by the District Court on 
the 21st day of August, 1985 (R. 162-166). On June 16, 1986, 
notice of appearance of new counsel was filed by Wilford A. 
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Beesley on behalf of SLCC (R. 199-200). On December 9, 1986, 
SLCC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Amend 
Complaint, which was set for hearing on the 22nd day of December, 
1986 (R. 223-224). 
At such hearing, on December 22, 1986, before the Honorable 
Judith M. Billings, the District Court had agreed to consider two 
issues only with regard to SLCC's Motion. First, the court 
agreed to reconsider procedurally whether or not it was going to 
allow SLCC to reargue the Summary Judgment Motion which had been 
granted some time prior. Secondly, whether or not it would allow 
SLCC to amend its Complaint and plead the alter ego theory of 
liability against Hood. 
The court ruled in favor of Hood on both issues and denied 
SLCC's Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend its Complaint (R. 
277). From such ruling, Second Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 301-305), and a Second Amended Order (R. 
298-300) were entered by the court. Further, such Order 
certified for appeal purposes the Summary Judgment granted in 
favor of Hood. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The only facts that were before the District Court at the 
time of the Summary Judgment Motion, were those items contained 
in the materials submitted to, and on file with, the District 
Court at the time of the said hearing. Such materials include: 
1. Motion of Third-Party Defendant Hood Corporation for 
Summary Judgment (R. 125-127). 
4 
2* Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of 
Third-Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment against 
Third-Party Plaintiff (R. 113-124). 
3. Affidavit of Marc Laulhere (R. 148-149). 
4. Reply Affidavit (R. 153-160). 
Note: copies of items in paragraphs 1 through 4 above are 
attached in the addendum to this brief. 
The only factual materials in support of SLCC's position 
that were before the District Court at the time of the Summary 
Judgment Motion were those contained in the Reply Affidavit of 
SLCC's attorney, Arthur Kessler (R. 153-160). No depositions 
which had been taken were on file with, or presented to, the 
District Court at the time of the Summary Judgment Motion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hood contends that error was not made by the District Court 
in granting a summary judgment in its favor and against SLCC. 
Further, this court on appeal can only review and consider those 
items from the record that were before the lower court at the 
time of the Summary Judgment Motion. However, assuming arguendo, 
if this court could consider all facts now set forth by SLCC, 
Summary Judgment would still be improper, inasmuch as factual 
allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to SLCC, are 
insufficient to meet the requirements under the two-prong test 
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in piercing the corporate 
veil. 
Hood further contends that the District Court is not 
compelled to reconsider a matter which has been argued and 
5 
resolved on its merits* Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides for certification of certain classes of final 
judgments for appeal purposes, and gives the court discretion of 
review in certain cases* Such rule does not mandate that the 
court must allow parties to reargue dispositive matters which 
have previously been decided on their merits. 
Furthermore, error was not made by the District Court in 
finding that SLCC, as a public entity with vast resources, should 
be held to a high standard of performance when proceeding against 
private entities, and that it should further be bound by the 
performance of the counsel it retains. The court did not create 
different judicial standards, but simply stated by such finding 
that a government entity should be required to perform at the 
highest level of competence in proceeding against private 
individuals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING HOOD 
CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF ALTER 
EGO. 
A. The record to be reviewed on appeal only consists of 
materials and exhibits presented to and filed with the District 
Court at the time of such proceeding. 
On August 2, 1985, after the lawsuit had been pending 
against Hood for more than one year, the Hood Corporation filed 
and argued its Motion for Summary Judgment, supported by a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and an Affidavit from the 
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President of Hood, Marc Laulhere. In response to such Motion, 
SLCC filed no official memoranda, but filed a document entitled 
"Reply Affidavit" executed by its attorney of record, Arthur 
Kessler. In such Reply Affidavit, Attorney Kessler set forth his 
opinions as to why he believed the alter ego theory of liability 
raised factual issues and thus should prohibit the court from 
granting the Summary Judgment as prayed by the Hood Corporation. 
The Reply Affidavit filed by SLCC's attorney, Arthur 
Kessler, together with the pleadings on file, were the only 
materials that District Judge Judith M. Billings was given to 
review and consider in support of SLCC's defense to the Summary 
Judgment Motion. No affidavits were submitted setting forth 
facts that would be admissible in evidence from people competent 
to testify at trial. The depositions which had been taken of 
various parties prior to the Motion had not been published, were 
not presented to the court, and with the exception of several 
references made to the deposition of Marc Laulhere, as set forth 
in Attorney Kessler's Affidavit, no materials were submitted from 
any other depositions, nor were they presented to the court in 
any manner. 
In Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelity and Guaranty 
Insurance Underwriters Inc., 380 P.2d 135 (Utah 1963), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth a general principle of appellant review 
when it stated as follows: 
"Four depositions were urged for examination by 
this court. Somehow two are here, two not, none of 
which was published or presented to the trial court. 
The two in our court still are sealed. Under simple 
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principles of appellate review, we cannot consider 
matters not in the record before the trial court, 
absence of which was made apparent on examination of 
the record filed with this court/' 
In Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 384 P.2d 109 (Utah 1963), 
the Utah Supreme Court made a similar finding with regard to the 
use of depositions on appeal which were not considered by the 
trial court. The court stated as follows: 
"These depositions reach us in sealed envelopes— 
the notary public's seal still intact. Thus, it is 
apparent that they were never marked and introduced 
into evidence nor read by the trial judge. 
"Both parties quote extensively from these 
depositions in their briefs. Probably they each had 
copies, and probably these were used at hearing upon 
the Motion for Summary Judgment. However, this we 
cannot assume. In fact, we must assume that the 
testimony contained in the depositions was not 
?resented to or considered by the lower court." Emphasis added.) 
It is a well established rule in Utah that matters which are 
not part of the trial court record will not be considered by the 
appellate court on appeal. Rosander v. Larsen, 376 P.2d 146 
(Utah 1962), Uckerman v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, 
588 P. 2d 142 (Utah 1978), Geis v. Continental Oil Company, 511 
P.2d 725 (Utah 1973), First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey 
Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980), Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 
639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981), Baldwin & Associates v. Smith, 646 P.2d 
711 (Utah 1982), Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 
699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), Daggett v. Tiffany, 467 P.2d 629 (Wash. 
app 1970). 
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B. No genuine issues as to any material facts exist with 
regard to the alter ego theory of liability that would prevent 
the entry of summary judgments 
It is not disputed by Hood herein that a Summary Judgment 
cannot be granted where a genuine issue as to any material facts 
exist. Further, on appeal, the appellate court must view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the losing party. However, 
Hood strongly disagrees with the assertion by SLCC that the 
question of alter ego itself is an issue of fact that cannot be 
properly disposed of through Summary Judgment. SLCC cites the 
case of Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1981), in support of this broad proclamation. In Amjacs, 
the Utah Supreme Court found that the record revealed disputed 
issues of material fact, making a Summary Judgment in that case 
inappropriate inasmuch as a written agreement referred to both 
the corporate party and the individual in its individual 
capacity, thus creating an ambiguity with regard to the written 
document. Further, inasmuch as the District Court had not 
considered the plaintiff's alter ego claims in its Order of 
Dismissal, and under the facts of such case, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that issues of fact were raised. 
The facts of Amjacs, supra, were not on point with the 
instant case, and it is asserted herein that such case does not 
stand for the proposition as set forth by SLCC, in that the very 
nature of an alter ego theory of liability precludes summary 
judgment without a trial on the facts. 
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To be successful in asserting an alter ego theory of 
liability, and thus pierce through the corporate veil, the Utah 
Supreme Court has adopted a two-prong test, as set forth in 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift and Loan, 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 
1979). In Norman, the two-prong test was stated as follows? 
(1) "There must be such unity of interest and 
ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer exist, vis., 
the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one or a 
few individuals; and 
(2) "The observance of the corporate form would 
sanction a fraud, promoting justice, where an equitable 
result would follow*" 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Messick v* PHD Trucking Service, 
Inc* , 678 P.2d 791 (Utah 1984), in reversing the trial court's 
judgment, piercing the corporate veil, set forth that no 
justification existed for piercing the veil between the defendant 
corporation and its officers, reaffirmed the two-prong test set 
forth in Norman, supra, and went on to state: 
"The first prong of the test is often termed the 
'formalities requirement1, referring to the corporate 
formalities required by statute* It is established on 
a showing of the corporation's failure to observe such 
statutory formalities. The second prong is addressed 
to the conscience of the Court, and the circumstances 
under which it will be met vary with each case* 
"The record before us is devoid of proof to 
justify the trial court"s ruling that the corporate 
entity should be disregarded* No evidence was adduced 
to establish the corporation's neglect of statutory 
formalities nor was any evidence received to the affect 
that any observance of the corporate entity would 
'sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or produce an 
equitable result'." 
If this Court reviews each and every fact as submitted to 
the District Court at the time of Hood's Motion for Summary 
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Judgment, and views such facts in a light most favorable to SLCC, 
such facts under that preview do not raise any genuine issue of a 
material fact that would preclude the entry of Summary Judgment 
on the alter ego theory of liability. Not one factual issue was 
asserted or alleged as to whether or not corporate formalities 
were kept by the Hood Corporation and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, James Constructors, Inc. To the contrary, both were 
alleged to be valid corporations, incorporated in California and 
Nevada respectively, and no allegations or assertions were to the 
contrary with regard to the failure to observe corporate 
formalities. 
In addition, with regard to the second prong of the Utah 
Supreme Court's test, namely, that the observance of the 
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an 
inequitable result would follow, such is also contrary to any 
interpretation of the facts before the court. The record shows 
that SLCC contracted with James Constructors, Inc. and required 
that they be fully bonded, which they were by the Industrial 
Indemnity Insurance Company. No allegations have been made or 
factual assertions set forth, which, taken in any light, would 
sanction a fraud, promote injustice or cause an inequitable 
result, thereby meeting the second prong of the two-prong test 
used by the Utah Supreme Court in piercing the corporate veil. 
C« Hood Corporation, as a matter of law, was entitled to a 
summary judgment on the alter ego theory of liability against 
Salt Lake City Corporation. 
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The facts as considered by the District Court, viewed in the 
light most favorable to SLCC, could not support a finding, as a 
matter of law, that the corporate veil of the Hood Corporation be 
pierced. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Institutional 
Laundry, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 
1985): 
MA corporation, be it parent or subsidiary, has 
its own legal identity and existence. Common ownership 
or control does not automatically destroy that separate 
entity. Although in appropriate cases equity may look 
through the corporate shell to its alter ego to prevent 
fraud or wrong doing, the general rule still applies 
that corporations are separate legal entities bound by 
the obligations as well as the benefits." 
The District Court, in granting a Summary Judgment in favor 
of the respondent Hood, had no alternative based upon the 
evidence presented to it, as a matter of law. Assuming all facts 
presented to the District Court were true, and viewing them in 
the light most favorable to SLCC, to disregard the corporate 
entity and pierce the corporate veil under the alter ego theory 
of liability, allegations and factual assertions sufficient to 
meet the two-prong test of the Utah Supreme Court would need to 
be set forth. Factual assertions sufficient to do such do not 
exist, pursuant to the record on review herein. 
POINT II 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO NOT RECONSIDER THE 
PRIOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN FAVOR OF HOOD CORPORATION. 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the 
circumstance where multiple claims or multiple parties are 
present in ligitation, and where a court directs final judgment 
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as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties* 
Certification of the order is necessary prior to appellate review 
of such final order* Based thereon, the Summary Judgment entered 
by the court in August of 1984 was not an appealable order as of 
that time, inasmuch as it did not have the certification that 
Rule 54(b) requires* However, SLCC would have the court believe 
that the lower court was mandated to reconsider a prior final 
order, the original Summary Judgment, and therefore rehear an 
earlier matter which had been argued and decided on its merits. 
The District Court has never claimed not to have the power 
to reconsider such order, but elected not to review its prior 
order insamuch as it had been argued and decided on its merits, 
and no circumstances existed which would pursuade the court to do 
otherwise* It is submitted that such a position by the District 
Court Judge was not error, and was well within the discretion the 
court had under Rule 54(b)* The District Court felt, as does 
respondent herein, that an appellant review was still available 
to the plaintiff, which is the subject matter of this appeal, and 
that a second trial at the District Court level on the same 
factual issues was not warranted, and in fact would have been 
prejudicial to Hood, based on the extreme amount of time which 
had lapsed between the original granting of the Summary Judgment 
and the request for reconsideration under 54(b)* 
To rule otherwise at this point would be to mandate any 
District Court to rehear matters which have been argued and 
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decided on their merits in every case, which is clearly not the 
intention of Rule 54(b) as set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION, AS A GOVERNMENT ENTITY WITH VAST RESOURCES, SHOULD 
BE HELD TO A HIGHER STANDARD OF PERFORMANCE IN PURSUING A LEGAL 
ACTION AGAINST A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, AND THAT THEY ARE BOUND BY 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE COUNSEL THEY RETAIN. 
The finding by the District Court that SLCC, as a government 
entity with vast resources, should be held to a higher standard 
of performance in pursuing a legal action against a private 
individual, and that SLCC is bound by the actions and performance 
of the attorney it retains, was not a dispositive matter in this 
case* Such determination had nothing to do with the original 
Summary Judgment Motion which is on review by this court. 
Further, the District Court's election to not reconsider its 
prior Summary Judgment was independent from the determination in 
this case. Such finding was directed at the level of legal 
competence and performance which a counsel representing a public 
entity should perform to. Neither of the cases cited by 
appellant SLCC, in opposition to this position, and in support of 
that supposedly well established doctrine, is on point with this 
issue as set forth by the District Court« 
In State v. Taira, 78 NM 276, 430 P.2d 773, 777 (1967), the 
governmental entity sought relief from the individual defendant's 
discovery requests under sovereign immunity grounds, but such 
governmental entity had on the other hand brought an action in 
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the courts seeking relief from the court under Rules of Civil 
Procedure against this individual. The New Mexico Supreme Court 
ruled that where a governmental entity seeks relief in court 
under Rules of Civil Procedure, it waives certain governmental 
immunities, and under such Rules of Civil Procedure, is an 
ordinary litigant. 
In Bank Line v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, (2nd Cir. 
1947), also cited by SLCC in support of its position, the Second 
Circuit Court ruled with regard to an admiralty case, wherein the 
governmental entity did not want to comply with discovery rules 
and disclose materials, on the grounds that the investigation it 
had conducted had been for naval purposes, and therefore such 
results of the investigation were not discoverable pursuant to 
the court order. Such governmental entity sought a protective 
order of the court relieving it from complying with discovery 
rules. The Second Circuit, in denying such protective order, 
stated that where the governmental entity seeks to prevent the 
discovery of certain materials, such prevention must be done 
pursuant to the general rules and procedures which apply to an 
ordinary citizen. 
Neither case above cited was on point with the issue as set 
forth by the District Court in its statement that SLCC should be 
held to a higher level of performance. Such ruling was not an 
error under the facts and circumstances as applied in this case. 
This finding by the District Court is vastly different from 
holding SLCC to a greater burden of proof or different standard 
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of civil procedure. However, notwithstanding the foregoing, such 
issue with regard to the level of performance with which SLCC 
should be held, was not a part of the Summary Judgment entered in 
this case and was not dispositive with regard to any facts 
concerning the prior Summary Judgment entered in favor of Hood. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In view of the foregoing, the actions taken by the District 
Court, in conjunction with the granting of Summary Judgment, are 
proper and supported by the facts before such court. Further, 
the two-prong test set up by the Utah Supreme Court in piercing 
the corporate veil, assuming all facts alleged by SLCC are true, 
could not be met. Further, the District Court did not err in 
electing to not reconsider the earlier judgment, under Rule 
54(b), wherein its prior determination had been a matter argued 
and resolved on its merits. Finally, the statement that SLCC 
should be held to a high level of performance based on its vast 
resources, was neither dispositive nor prejudicial, and was not 
in error when taken in context as set forth by the District Court 
below. 
Therefore, Hood Corporation respectfully requests this court 
to affirm the District Court's entry of Summary Judgment granted 
in its favor. 
DATED this // day of October, 1987. 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
&/tfA<~< 
DAVID A. REEVE 
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DAVID A. REEVE #2717 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
Attorney for Third Party 
Defendant Hood Corporation 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephones (801) 359-2093 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., i 
a Nevada corporation, j 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, : 
Defendant. : 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, : 
a municipal corporation of : 
the State of Utah, s 
Third Party Plaintiff, : 
VS. ! 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, HOOD 
CORPORATION, California 
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Third Party Defendants. 
: MOTION OF THIRD PARTY 
: DEFENDANT HOOD CORPORATION 
: FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. C 84-2857 
: Judge Judith Billings 
COMES NOW the third party defendant, Hood Corporation, 
by and through their attorney of record, David A. Reeve, and 
hereby makes motion to the Court for a Summary Judgment in 
their behalf, against the third party plaintiff, Salt Lake 
City Corporation. Such motion is based upon Rule 56(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. 
The third party defendant Hood Corporation's motion is 
based upon the pleadings on file herein, the Answers to 
Interrogatories submitted by the third party plaintiff, 
Affidavit of the president of Hood Corporation, and the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted herewith. All 
of the foregoing establish that there are no genuine issues 
of material fact as between the third party plaintiff, Salt 
Lake City Corporation, and the third party defendant, Hood 
Corporation, and thereby such third party defendant is 
entitled to a Summary Judgment ordering the dismissal of all 
claims brought by said third party plaintiff, pursuant to 
their prayer in the Answer filed herein. 
DATED this day of June, 1985. 
DAVID A. REEVE 
Attorney for Third Party 
Defendant Hood Corporation 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Motion of Third Party Defendant Hood 
Corporation for Summary Judgmentf postage pre-paid, this 
day of June, 1985 to the following: 
Arthur L. Keesler, Jr. 
Attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation 
100 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Cc Reed Brown 
Attorney for James Constructors, Inc. 
and Industrial Indemnity Company 
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 > 
f 
DAVID A. REEVE #2717 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
Attorney for Third Party 
Defendant Hood Corporation 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2093 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., : 
a Nevada corporation, : 
Plaintiff, s 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. : 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, : 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., : 
a Nevada corporation, HOOD : 
CORPORATION, California 
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Third Party Defendants. ! 
! MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
t AND AUTHORITIES IN 
: SUPPORT OF THIRD PARTY 
: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
: THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF 
: Civil No. C 84-2857 
: Judge Judith Billings 
COMES NOW the third party defendant Hood Corporation, by 
and through their attorney of record David A, Reeve, and 
hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and Author-
ities in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment against 
third party plaintifff Salt Lake City Corporation. 
FACTS 
1. According to the Complaint of the third party plain-
tiff, Salt Lake City Corporation, on or about the 23rd day of 
May, 1983, Notice to Bidders was sent to James Constructors, 
Inc., for the construction of the Big Cottonwood Conduit 
Extention Terminal/Park Transmission Pipeline. 
2. Further, on or about June 8, 1983, when the bids 
were opened, James Constructors, Inc. was the apparent low 
bidder concerning said project. Based thereon, additional 
information was requested of James Constructors, Inc. prior 
to their receiving the said contract. In response to the 
request for additional information, James Constructors, Inc. 
through their president, James E. Foreman, sent a letter 
dated June 13, 1983, together with various enclosures as ref-
erenced by said letter, to the Salt Lake City Corporation. 
The said letter and some of the enclosed materials were atta-
ched to the Complaint of third party plaintiff Salt Lake City 
Corporation as exhibits. 
3. The June 13, 1983 letter, executed by James E. 
Foreman, president of James Constructors, Inc., was sent to 
Mr. Larry Allen, on behalf of the Salt Lake City Corporation, 
referred in paragraph 4 to an enclosed financial report from 
the Hood Corporation. Further, it stated that James 
Constructors, Inc. was a wholly owned subsidary of the Hood 
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Corporation, as shown by the enclosed statement. Within the 
consolidated financial statement submitted, there was a com-
plete audited statement of the Hood Corporation and all of 
its subsidiaries. The financial data concerning James Con-
structors, Inc. was specifically set forth independently, and 
all of the assets, liabilities and other important data 
regarding James Constructors, Inc. was listed separately as 
would be the procedure under a consolidated financial state-
ment such as the one submitted. 
4. In the deposition of James E. Foreman, president of 
James Constructors, Inc., he states that the sole reason he 
submitted the Hood Corporation's audited consolidated finan-
cial statement, was that Salt Lake City Corporation had 
requested an audited statement from James Constructors, Inc. 
and he did not have a statement which was audited independent 
from the consolidated statement regarding the Hood Corpora-
tion and its subsidiaries. Therefore, he submitted the con-
solidated statement which was audited and certified by Ernst 
& Whitney, C.P.A. 
5. Salt Lake City Corporation alleges in its Complaint 
that their award of the construction contract to James Con-
structors, Inc. was based solely on the experience and finan-
cial stability of the Hood Corporation. 
6. The Salt Lake City Corporation, in response to the 
James Constructors, Inc.fs Second Set of Interrogatories, 
stated as follows: 
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Interrogatory No, 5: State with specificity, all items 
or areas of additional information requested concerning 
James Constructors based solely upon the experience and 
financial stability of the Hood Corporation. 
Answer; See attached Exhibit "A" reply letter to James 
Constructors. 
Interrogatory No. 6: State all facts on which the city 
relies in alleging that the city awarded the contract to 
James Constructors based solely upon the experience and 
financial stability of Hood Corporation. 
Answer: See Exhibit "A" which states that James Constr-
uctors is a wholly owned subsidiary of Hood Corporation 
and the only financial information supplied was the 
financial report for Hood Corporation. 
7. There are no other allegations by the Salt Lake City 
Corporation with regard to any contact they had with the Hood 
Corporation directly, or any oral or written representations 
of any nature from Hood Corporation to the Salt Lake City 
Corporation. Salt Lake City Corporation thereafter awarded 
the contract to James Constructors, Inc. 
8. Salt Lake City Corporation required that James 
Constructors, Inc. obtain a performance bond concerning the 
said project. Such performance bond was obtained from the 
Industrial Indemnity Company in the amount of $1,128,481.00. 
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9. All contracts, agreements and related documents 
which were prepared by the Salt Lake City Corporation concer-
ning the awarding of this project, were prepared for the sig-
nature of James Constructors, Inc., as the sole contractor, 
and the Industrial Indemnity Company as their surety. No 
reference was made in any written documents prepared by the 
Salt Lake City Corporation as to the third party defendant 
Hood Corporation. 
10. No allegations have been made by the Salt Lake City 
Corporation as to any contact the city has had with the third 
party defendant Hood Corporation, and a negative response has 
been given to such request in the Answers to Interrogatories 
filed pursuant therewith by Salt Lake City Corporation. 
11. Based upon all pleadings on file herein, together 
with the Answers to Interrogatories submitted by the Salt 
Lake City Corporation, the city's claim as to liability on 
the part of the third party defendant Hood Corporation, is 
based upon the fact that James Constructors, Inc. is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of such party. Further, that James Constru-
ctors, Inc. submitted a consolidated audited financial state-
ment of the Hood Corporation and its subsidiaries to Salt 
Lake City Corporation. 
POINT I 
STATUTE OP FRAUDS PROHIBITS THE LIABILITY OF THE HOOD 
CORPORATION BASED UPON THE CLAIMS OF SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION 
Pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, found in §25-5-4, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, wherein such section 
in part states as follows: 
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Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. 
- "In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum there-
of, is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith". . . (2) - "Every promise to answer for the 
debt, default or miscarriage of another." 
The basis for the Statute of Frauds, is to prohibit the 
unjust liability of a party for the acts of another based 
upon oral representations or naked assertions. Liability for 
the debts of a third party is a substantial imposition, and 
should only be founded upon a substantial basis for such. 
All parties are entitled to the presumptions and specific 
limitations as set forth in the Statute of Frauds above 
stated. 
In a subsequent section within the Statute of Frauds, 
§25-5-5, Utah Code Annotated, such states as follows: 
"Representations as to credit of a third person. - To 
charge a person upon a representation as to the credit 
of a third person, such representation, or some memoran-
dum thereof, must be in writing subscribed by the party 
to be charged therewith." 
Again it is clear that the statutory mandate is that 
prior to a third party being charged with the debt of ano-
ther, he must have assented to such obligation in writing. 
Under the facts of the instant case, it is undisputable that 
the Hood Corporation had no contact with Salt Lake City Corp-
oration themselves, nor did they make any representations in 
writing to said Salt Lake City Corporation. Further, all of 
the said documents were prepared by the Salt Lake City Corpo-
ration after reviewing the audited consolidated financial 
statement of the Hood Corporation and their subsidary James 
Constructors, Inc., and no reference was made to Hood Corpor-
ation and no attempt was made to secure their guarantee. 
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POINT II 
THE CONTRACT ITSELF PRECLUDES LIABILITY ON THE PART OF THE 
HOOD CORPORATION 
Within the written agreement between Salt Lake City Cor-
poration and James Constructors, Inc., Article 17, entitled 
Contract Documents, sets forth specifically the following: 
"This agreement consists of the documents listed under 
§1.6 of the general provisions attached, all of which 
are made a part hereof and none of which can be altered, 
except in writing signed by both parties." 
Within all such documents, no reference or inference is 
made to or by the Hood Corporation. James Constructors, 
Inc., is listed as the bidder, and the contractor. The 
contractor, is defined in §1.08 of the general provisions as: 
"The person or persons, co-partnership or corporation 
who have entered into a contract with Salt Lake City 
Corporation." 
Further, Industrial Indemnity Company, is listed as the 
surety, and a performance bond was signed, executed and sub-
mitted to Salt Lake City Corporation in conjunction with the 
award of said contract. 
Inasmuch as all of the said contract documents, which 
were substantial, were prepared by Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion, such should be construed strictly against said party. 
Their own documents specifically state that James Construc-
tors, Inc. is the sole contractor, and that no alteration or 
modification may be had except that is in writing and signed 
by all parties thereto. Had Salt Lake City Corporation desi-
red to receive the guarantee or additional assurance from the 
Hood Corporation, it would have been very easy to request 
under the signature of such, and in fact it was absolutely 
required under the terms of the contract if it is to alter 
the said contract, or become a part of such contract. 
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POINT III 
CONTRACT LAW PROHIBITS THE IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY WHERE NO 
PRIVITY EXISTS BETWEEN SAID PARTIES 
Pursuant to the general provisions of contract law and 
the concept of privity, the American Juris Prudence volume on 
contracts states as follows: 
"As a general thing, the obligation of contracts is 
limited to the parties making them, and, ordinarily, 
only those who are parties to contracts are liable for 
their breach. Parties to a contract cannot thereby 
impose any liability on one who, under its terms, is a 
stranger to the contract, and in any event, in order to 
bind a third person contractually, and expression of 
assent by such person is necessary. This is particu-
larly so where the contract is one for services. In the 
case of a written contract, the person who is not named 
in, or bound by, the terms of a written contract cannot 
be rendered liable on it by a mere intention that he 
should be bound . . ." 17 Am.Jur. 2nd, Contracts, §294. 
It is undisputed that the third party defendant, Hood 
Corporation, is a valid California corporation, and the 
plaintiff and third party defendant, James Constructors, 
Inc., is a valid Nevada corporation. Further, that the 
defendant and third party plaintiff, Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion, is a valid Utah corporation. Each of these parties are 
separate and distinct entities, free to contract among them-
selves. There have been no allegations in any of the plead-
ings herewith, or in the Answers to Interrogatories submitted 
by Salt Lake City Corporation, regarding any contractual 
relationship between the Salt Lake City Corporation and the 
third party defendant, Hood Corporation. Based upon the 
principles of contract law, such entities being separate and 
distinct among themselves, should preclude any liability on 
the part of the Hood Corporation and be additional basis for 
Summary Judgment as prayed by such third party defendant. 
-7-
POINT IV 
PRINCIPLES OP CORPORATE LAW DICTATE INDEPENDENT LIABILITY 
AMONG PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATION 
It is without dispute, that a parent and a subsidiary 
corporation, can be two separate and distinct entities. In 
fact, by definition if such corporations are valid, two dis-
tinct entities exist. In Fletchers Cyclopedia Corporations, 
§43, this general rule of law is stated as follows; 
"Ownership of all the stock of a corporation coupled 
with common management and direction does not, however, 
operate as a merger of two corporations into one single 
entity. Under ordinary circumstances a parent corpora-
tion will not be liable for the obligations of its 
subsidiary." 
"A contract in terms and in name of one corporation 
cannot be treated as that of both, if they are in law 
separate entities, and so dealt with; . . ." 
The above principles from Fletchers are well established 
rules of law throughout the country. The principle that a 
parent corporation, and its subsidiary are viewed as indepen-
dent corporations, and not liable for the obligations of each 
other is a well recognized point of law. See: Cole vs. City 
of Las Cruces, 567 P.2nd, 629 (N.M. 1983); Anderson vs. 
Section 11, Inc., 626 P.2nd, 1027, (WA App. 1981); Service 
Iron Foundry, Inc. vs. M.A. Bell, Company, 588 P.2nd, 463 
(Kan. App. 1978); Schlecht vs. Equitable Builders, Inc., 535 
P.2nd, 86 (OR 1975); Pearlman vs. Great States Life Insurance 
Company, 436 P.2nd, 164 (Colo. 1968). 
Under the facts of the instant case, even though James 
Constructors, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidy of the Hood 
Corporation, each are separate and distinct from each other. 
There have been no allegations to the contrary. 
-8-
ARGUMENT AND SUMMARY 
It is asserted by the third party defendant Hood Corpor-
ationf that no genuine issues as to any material facts 
exists, and a Summary Judgment should be granted in their 
favor, dismissing any claims of the third party plaintiff, 
Salt Lake City Corporation, against such party. The Salt 
Lake City Corporation asserts liability on the part of third 
party defendant Hood Corporation based upon their receipt of 
a copy of Hood's consolidated financial statement, and as 
they further allege, they would not have awarded the contract 
to James Constructors, Inc. unless it was upon the reliance 
on the strength and financial ability of the Hood Corpora-
tion. It is respectfully submitted to the Court that such 
bare contentions of the Salt Lake City Corporation are unsup-
ported by any facts in law or equity and raise no material 
question of fact as will preclude the entry of Summary Judg-
ment in this matter. 
The Utah Supreme Court has been very explicit in follow-
ing such rational. In the case of Massey vs. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 609 P.2nd, 937, (Utah 1980), Justice Hall in aff-
irming a lower Court Summary Judgment decision, which dismis-
sed the claim of a plaintiff alleging negligence on the part 
of the defendant, Utah Power & Light, when they stated: "A 
Motion for Summary Judgment is an effective means of 
ascertaining the existence of undisputed facts to help 
support a judgment as a matter of law and thus avoid the 
necessity of trial. Of courtse, Summary Judgment is 
appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, affida-
vits and other submission of the parties reflect that 
there is no genuine issue of a material fact. However, 
bare conentions, unsupported by any specification of 
facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of 
fact as will preclude the entry of a Summary Judgment." 
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In the Massey case, the Court in viewing the totality of 
the circumstances of the allegations and responses of the 
parties, ruled as a matter of law that the defendant was not 
negligent in the maintenance of the power lines which elect-
rocuted the said plaintiff. In the case at hand, a similar 
analogy should be reached on the part of the defendant Hood 
Corporation. They are a separate and distinct entity, with 
the only connection in this case being the fact that they are 
the sole owner of the stock of James Constructors, Inc. If 
that fact alone creates liability on their part, justice 
would not be served and it would be contrary to the status of 
the law. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted by the third 
party defendant, Hood Corporation, that third party plain-
tiff, Salt Lake City Corporation's Complaint be dismissed as 
to them, pursuant to the prayer of their Answer. 
DATED this day of June, 1985. 
DAVID 7A. REEVE 
Attorney for Third Party 
Defendant Hood Corporation 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Third Party Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Third Party Plaintiff, postage pre-paid, 
this day of June, 1985 to the following: 
Arthur L. Keesler, Jr. 
Attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation 
100 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
C. Reed Brown 
Attorney for James Constructors, Inc. 
and Industrial Indemnity Company 
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 / 
DAVID A. REEVE #2717 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
Attorney for Third Party 
Defendant Hood Corporation 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2093 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, HOOD 
CORPORATION, California 
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Third Party Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARC LAULHERE 
Civil No. C 84-2857 
Judge Judith Billings 
ss. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
I, Marc Laulhere, after being duly sworn upon oath, 
depose and state as follows: 
1. That I am the president of the Hood Corporation, the 
third party defendant in the above entitled action, and have 
been throughout the period of time in question in the pending 
suit. 
2. That James Constructors, Inc., a Nevada corporation, 
is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Hood Corporation. Fur-
ther, such entity is a valid independent corporation, and 
operates independently from the Hood Corporation. 
3. Regarding the contract between the third party 
plaintiff, Salt Lake City Corporation, and James Construc-
tors, Inc., which was entered into in the summer of 1983, 
Hood Corporation was never contacted in any way by Salt Lake 
City Corporation regarding the execution of said contract. 
4. That the Hood Corporation and its subsidiaries, have 
an annual audited consolidated financial statement prepared. 
Within this audited consolidated statement, each of the Hood 
Corporation's subsidiaries are listed independently, specifi-
cally outlining all of their assets and liabilities and 
financial data, distinct and seperate of their parent, the 
Hood Corporation.; Such audited statement is distributed by 
the Hood Corporation to each of its subsidiaries and other 
interested parties. 
5. That the Hood Corporation never furnished any finan-
cial data to the Salt Lake City Corporation in connection 
with the James Constructors, Inc.'s bid and contract with 
said city, nor were they ever asked to furnish, either orally 
or in writing, any documentation or materials concerning 
their subsidiary James Constructors, Inc., or Hood Corpora-
tion's relationship with such. 
DATED this day of June, 1985. 
MARC LAUL'HERE 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of June, 
1985. 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: Residing at: 
ARTHUR L. KEESLER, JR. #17 81 
A t t o r n e y f o r T h i r d P a r t y P l a i n t i f f 
S a l t Lake C i t y C o r p o r a t i o n 
100 C i t y & County B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 535 -7788 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, I N C . , ) 
a Nevada c o r p o r a t i o n , ) REPLY AFFIDAVIT 
P l a i n t i f f , ) 
) C i v i l No. C 84-2 857 
v s . ) 
) J u d g e J u d i t h B i l l i n g s 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, ) 
Defendants. ) 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, I N C . , 
a Nevada c o r p o r a t i o n , HOOD 
CORPORATION, C a l i f o r n i a 
c o r p o r a t i o n and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
C a l i f o r n i a c o r p o r a t i o n , 
T h i r d P a r t y D e f e n d a n t s . 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS, 
County of Salt Lake) 
Arthur L. Keeslerf Jr. being duly sworn deposes and states 
as follows: 
I am the attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation, the 
defendant and third party plaintiff in the above consolidated 
action. Third party defendant Hood Corporation has made a Motion 
for Summary Judgment based upon the fact that the third party 
defendant is a separate and legal entity and not responsible for 
the debts of their subsidiary corporation James Constructors, 
Inc. 
It is the theory of Salt Lake City Corporation in its 
Complaint that James Constructors, Inc. is nothing, but tha alter 
e^go of Hood Corporation and as such is not a separate entity and 
THat Hood Corporation is responsible for the breach of contract 
by James Constructors, Inc. It is a well known theory of law 
that to defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment there needs only to 
be a question of fact for the jury. Salt Lake City Corporation 
respectfully submits that there are many questions of fact for 
the jury and that the question of Hood Corporation's liability 
cannot be determined on a Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
leading case which sets down the criteria as to whether a parent 
corporation can be liable for a subsidiary on the basis of the 
theory of alter ego is Cruttenden v. Mantura, 640 P.2d 932. This 
case cites ten separate criteria that should be looked at by the 
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Court in determining whether a subsidiary i s an a l t e r ego of a 
parent corpora t ion . I t fur ther goes on to say t ha t not a l l of 
these gu ide l ines must be metf but these are only fac tors for the 
t r i a l court to consider in determining whether or not to 
recognize a corporat ion as a separa te e n t i t y . Examining these 
ten c r i t e r i a i t would seem tha t there are a t l e a s t six of the ten 
which would ind ica te t ha t James Constructors was nothing, but the 
a l t e r ego of Hood Corporation* The f i r s t c r i t e r i a would be "(1) 
the parent corporat ion owns a l l or a majority of the cap i t a l 
stock of the subs id ia ry . " In r e fe r r ing to the deposi t ion of Mark 
Laulhere the Pres ident of Hood Croporation taken on December 18, 
1984 at page 7 Mr. Laulhere was asked the following ques t ion: 
"And was t h i s an out and out cash purchase? Did 
you purchase a l l of i t , 100% of the stock in W.C. 
James? 
"Answer: Yes." 
As can be seen from Mr. Laulhere1s answer the f i r s t c r i t e r i a i s 
c l e a r l y met in tha t Hood Corporation owns a l l of the stock of 
James Const ructors , Inc . 
C r i t e r i a No.(3)the parent corporat ion finances the 
subs id ia ry . Page 17 of Mr. Laulhere1 s deposition:: 
"Question: Has Hood Corporation loaned any money 
to James Constructors? 
"Answer: We have advanced funds but we haven ' t 
made spec i f i c loans . 
"Question: Do you have any idea approximately how 
much has been advanced to James? 
"Answer: No I d o n ' t . 
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"Ques t ion : Do you know the terms of the repayment 
by James to Hood? 
"Answer: We h a v e n ' t e s t a b l i s h e d any terms of 
repayment ." 
Page 18 
"Question: Are you the guarantors of any loans 
that have been made to James? 
"Answer: Yes. 
"Question: Can you give me the approximate amount 
of these loans? 
"Answer: My recollection is that we have just 
guaranteed one loan at First Security Bank in 
Utah. 
"Question: Do you know the amount of that loan? 
"Answer: Originally it was for $300,000. I'm not 
sure of the exact amount. 
"Question: And do you know what the loan was for? 
"Answer: I think it was to pay off some other 
loans and provide working capital." 
Criteria No. (5) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate 
capital. As can be seen from the attached Exhibit "A" the 
consolidated statement of operations and return any earnings for 
Hood Corporation and its subsidiaries James Constructors showed a 
net loss for the year 1983 of $36f000. 
Criteria No. (8) In the papers of the parent corporation, 
and in the statements of its officers the "subsidiary" is 
referred to as such or as a department of the division. 
As can be clearly seen from the consolidated financial 
statement of Hood James Contructors is included in the 
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consolidated financial statement and is included as a subsidiary 
of Hood Corporation. 
Criteria No. (9) The directors or executives of the 
subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the 
subsidiary but take direction from the parent corporation 
referring once again to the deposition of Mark Laulhere the 
president of Hood Corporation page 3 6 line 18 through 25. 
"Question: And did you approve both of these 
bonds or these requests for bonding? 
"Answer: Yes. 
"Question: And do you receive per iodic r epor t s on 
those p a r t i c u l a r jobs as you did on the Sal t Lake 
City job .? 
"Answer: Yes. 
"Question: How often do you receive reports on 
those jobs? 
"Answer: A monthly basis. 
"Question: Do you review James Constructors 
financial structure on a monthly basis also? 
"Answer: Yes. 
"Question: Who does that review? 
"Answer: I do with our chief financial officer." 
As clearly can be seen James Constructors finances along with 
their jobs are closely monitored and directed by the officers of 
Hood Corporation, the parent corporation. 
Criteria No. (10) The formal legal requirements of the 
subsidiary as a separate and independent corporation are not 
observed. Once again referring to Mr. Laulhere's deposition 
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pages 38 and 39: 
"Question: Who performs the audit of James books? 
"Answer: Ernest and Whitney. 
" Q u e s t i o n : The same a u d i t o r s t h a t do y o u r s ? 
"Answer: Y e s . 
" Q u e s t i o n : And t h a t ' s a c o n s o l i d a t e d a u d i t ? 
"Answer: Y e s . 
As c l e a r l y can b e s e e n James a u d i t i s done by t h e p a r e n t 
c o r p o r a t i o n ' s a u d i t o r s a s p a r t of t h e p a r e n t c o r p o r a t i o n ' s 
c o n s o l i d a t e d a u d i t and i t i s n o t an i n d e p e n d e n t and s e p a r a t e 
a u d i t . 
I t i s r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h a t James C o n s t r u c t o r s I n c . 
was p u r c h a s e d by Hood C o r p o r a t i o n s o l e l y t o have a n o n - u n i o n 
company t o do b u s i n e s s i n t h e S t a t e of Utah and i s t o t a l l y 
c o n t r o l l e d by Hood C o r p o r a t i o n . As such i t i s a q u e s t i o n of f a c t 
f o r t h e j u r y t o d e t e r m i n e a t t h e t r i a l of t h i s a c t i o n w h e t h e r o r 
n o t Hood C o r p o r a t i o n i s r e s p o n s i b l e fo r t h e d e b t s and b r e a c h of 
c o n t r a c t of James C o n s t r u c t o r s and t h a t t h i s m o t i o n c a n n o t be 
d e c i d e d s i m p l y on t h e a f f i d a v i t of Mr. L a u l h e r e which i s t o t a l l y 
c o n t r a d i c t e d by h i s sworn t e s t i m o n y i n t h e d e p o s i t i o n . 
DATED t h i s 30 day of J u l y 198 5 . 
ARTHUR L. KEEStfER, JXj/ 
A s s i s t a n t C i t y A t t o r n e y 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this . ^ f ^ day of July, 
1985. 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Reply 
Affidavit to David A. Reeve, ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST, 1300 
Walker Center, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and to C. Reed Brown, 
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, 
by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, 
this ;=V<^K day of July, 1985. 
ccll7 
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ci&jiuxn^ ST\TI>L?.T CF c-^Tias AKD rsnua) EAFNTOS (irTicrr) 
PXD 0V*>O=*Tin* A»D SoP-Sm T J ' S 
JASMAJW 31 , 19^3 
J . A. T iv ro 
H o J TUi^^cn S e r v i c e s , 
Conso l ida t ed E l i m i n a t i o n s O o r r v n t i o n &S>n, I n c . I n c . 
^C%CTVH»S: 
0 » sf~u~t ion in ro i* 
*vilf;s and o the r o p - r P t i r ^ inrtT-c 
E q u i t y in incore fron par tner «,V ipe 
and j o i n t ventures 
Ir>-cr>» frcm F-arJi Arabian or»"*rations 
O t S ^ r , ne t 
C o s t s a r l expenses : 
Ccre t rvsc t ien cos t s 
Cent of s p i e s t-A o p r a t i t x * r*-r»*-\ses 
O n c r a l »-d a r r z in i s t r a t i ve o p v x s e s 
I n t e r e s t expense 
Lryts in connect ion wi th d i s p o s i t i o n 
o f T e v « Tsrv^ue, I n c . 
I X O E (U35S) FOTRE 15-T D*TD>£ 
CF SUBSIDIARIES AM) DCOE TAXES 
Ket ( l o s s ) of subs id i a ry 
P r o v i s i o n for federal and s t a t e 
i n c c a e taxes 
KET mnE (icss) 
Reta ined e a r n i n g s ( d e f i c i t ) as of 
J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1982 
Charge in connect ion v i t h a c q u i s i t i o n 
of 4 ,875 shares of ccranon s tock 
$63,r/. ' i,030 
2 ,177 ,no 
3,GC9,OX3 
1,293,000 
1,873,000 
72.I01.CCJO 
55,826,000 
2,618,030 
7,542,000 
711,030 
1,053,000 
67.7S0.CO0 
4,351,000 
1,873,000 
2,478,030 
8,837,000 
(342,000) 
$ 493,030 
2,567,000 
3 /60 ,030 
2,116,030 
1,831,0 0 
(£57,030) 
3 /K? ,q jQ 
(418;fO0) 
( 4 1 8 , 0 0 ) 
9^0,000 
$'•7/57,000 
3,6c9,CO0 
1,233,000 
l,716,Cno 
54,3-3,000 
43,535,000 
4,772,000 $ 
445,030 
1/53,000 
49,V)3/uO 
4,555,0311 
(418,000) 
1,659,030 
2,478,000 
8,837,000 1 
(342,000) 
5,000 
5 / » 0 
(5,000) 
(5,000) 
,051,000 
$ 8.000 
8,0 0 
(8,030) 
(8,030) 
(169,000) 
8 ,495 ,000 8,495,000 
KETAB3D EASSDCS (DEFICIT) 
AS OF JAWAKY.31, 1983 $10 ,973 ,000 $ 522.000 $10.973,000 $1,046,000 $(177 .000) 
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SCKEDUi£ 4 
Wjteux- n/uxs H Or»trotors PiL-J-e J . - e s K-rcury M & H 
I - - T . ~ » C , F O R , F ^ i i p r j i t K o J c o H o J Trucl i\ig C o r w t r u - t o - s , Constru t o r s , C o m x i i ca t i ons , 
l*d» __ Inc . ^ y ? l y Co. F a r n s , I n c . Cm*-truction C o . , I n c . I nc . Inc . I n c . 
$2,670,000 
$1,593,030 $13,814,030 
? ? , 2 5 5 , 0 ^ 0 $ 4 S / Q 3 371,030 $ 15.000 
~2,>55,030 4S/ - J0 3,041,030 15,000 
$ 1,Q~Q 8.000 ^ 2 ° ° 
1, CJ0 1,631 ,ttJ0 J 3,6--0 ,CO0 
1.P32.030 6,000 2,596,OX) 
25,030 22,000 531,030 
246,000 
13,000 1 , 9 3 6 / 0 0 n , 4 S 8 , 0 0 0 
$ 8,000 7,000 
13,000 144,000 1,135,000 
11,030 2,030 7,030 
1,857,000 28,000 3,373,l'JO 8.0JO 3 7 , 0 0 2,0=9,030 33,600,000 
39S.030 20,000 (332,030) 15 ,000 (8,030) (36,000) (4S?,030) 240,000 
133,000 81,000 
265,000 20,000 (332 ,OJO) 15,000 (8 ,030) (36.0JO) (458,030) 159,000 
469 ,000 (222,000) 1,169.000 (775 ,000) $90,000 195,000 19,000 (883,000) 
$ 734,000 $(202,000)$ 837,033 $(760,000) $?3,000 $183,000 $(36,030) $ (^69,030) $ (729,000) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were hand delivered this 19th 
day of October, 1987, to each of the following: 
C. Reed Brown, Esq. 
HINTZE & BROWN 
Attorneys for James Constructors 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Jay Jensen, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for James Constructors 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Wilford A. Beesley, Esq. 
Stanford P. Fitts, Esq. 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant Salt Lake City 
Corporation 
310 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 $/f&.* 
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SUPREME. COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKF CITY, UTAH 
September 4, 1987 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
David A Reeue, Esq. 
ARMSTRONG, RAW11NCS & WIST 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt lake CJ ty, UT 84111 
James Constructors, [nc., a 
Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v, No. 870103 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 
Defendant ana Appellant, 
Salt Lake* City Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
u . 
James Constructors, Inc., a 
Nevada corporation, Hood 
corporation, and Industrial 
Indemnity Company, a California 
corporat i on, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Pursuant to the the authority vested in this Court, 
this case is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for 
disposition. All further pleadings a.nd correspondence 
should be directed to that Court. Their address is 230 
South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Geoffrey J Butler, Clerk 
